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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. 
We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient 
investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth 
opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO 
duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as 
captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. 
Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in 
industry-adjusted investment in high growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, 
relative to those in low growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity-based compensation curbs 
the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings 
of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital 
allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in 
diversified firms. 
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1. Introduction 
When a sole individual acts as both CEO and chair of the board of a firm, the resulting 
CEO duality creates one of the most contentious issues in the field of strategic leadership. In 
their meta-analysis, Dalton et al. (1998) find no empirical relation between CEO duality and 
firm performance, yet the debate about whether to join or separate CEO and chair positions 
continues to receive considerable attention from both practitioners and academics (see, for 
example, Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 
1992, 1993; Dalton et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Krause and 
Semadeni, 2013; Yang and Zhao, 2014; Krause, 2017). While the global financial crisis 
triggered a wave of proposals to eliminate CEO duality and achieve independent board 
leadership, corporate leaders and policy-making bodies appear reluctant to adopt such an 
obligatory separation that suggests a “one size fits all” approach (Krause et al., 2014).  Even as 
recent years have seen a doubling of the number of firms that have separated their CEO and 
chair positions, most firms in Standard & Poor’s Execucomp continue to uphold CEO duality. 
During 1992-2013 the proportion of firms with CEO duality rarely drops below 50%.  
Academic research on CEO duality focuses mainly on firm performance and to date 
remains rather controversial. The theoretical grounds for a link between CEO duality and 
accounting- or market-based performance are extensive, yet no comprehensive evidence is 
available to confirm it. According to Dalton and Dalton (2011), little consistency appears in 
extant studies that relate CEO duality to financial performance. Krause et al. (2014) accordingly 
call for research that considers moderating attributes that might alter the strength or direction 
of the relationship. Subsequently, Duru et al. (2016) uncover that board independence 
attenuates the negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance, while Yang and Zhao (2014) 
show that when their competitive environment changes, CEO duality firms outperform non-
duality firms. 
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In contrast to prior literature, which mainly focuses on firm performance, we investigate 
how CEO duality affects the internal capital allocation policy in diversified firms.1 A large 
sample of multi-segment U.S. firms over the period 1992-2013 provides compelling empirical 
evidence that CEO duality is detrimental to investment efficiency. Prior literature has however 
ignored the channel(s) through which CEO duality affects firm value; hence this study 
contributes to strategic leadership literature by identifying a pathway through which CEO 
duality offers managers of diversified firms an opportunity to extract private benefits by 
misallocating corporate resources across business segments. 
This study also shows that the adverse effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency 
is only prevalent in firms that are potentially exposed to agency issues, particularly in the 
presence of high free cash flows and weak board governance. In addition, the results underscore 
the importance of CEOs’ equity-based compensation as an important internal governance 
device to align the interest of the CEO and the shareholders, and as such to curb the negative 
effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency. Lastly, this study identifies CEO ability, CEO 
succession origin, and longevity of business segments as additional important moderating 
attributes that moderate the (negative) effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency.  
The findings of this study provide strong support for the agency theory, which predicts 
that CEO duality reflects weaker board oversight and stronger managerial power, and suggests 
that boards should be independent from the management to prevent managerial entrenchment 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). The findings emphasize that the adverse impact of 
CEO duality on corporate policies affecting value is contingent on a firm’s board characteristics 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Davidson et al., 2004; Duru et al., 2016); further, they support 
                                                            
1 Internal capital allocation in diversified firms refers to the allocation of corporate resources to business segments 
for investment purposes. An efficient corporate resources allocation maximizes firm value. Following the seminal 
work of Rajan et al., (2000), this is achieved when the capital allocation process favours segments with relatively 
high growth opportunities (i.e., high-q segments) over segments with low growth opportunities (i.e., low-q 
segments). Throughout this study, the terms investment efficiency and internal capital allocation efficiency are 
used interchangeably to denote the same economic phenomenon. 
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the notion about complementarities in corporate governance practices, which appear to be 
aligned with one another and mutually enhance the ability of those practices to achieve effective 
corporate governance (see, for example, Rediker and Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008). In this 
vein, executive compensation is a powerful internal governance mechanism, able to mitigate 
the CEO duality rent-seeking behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Datta et al., 2009). Finally, 
in the spirit of Dalton and Dalton (2011) and Krause et al. (2014), the findings suggest that any 
future attempts to advance research towards the strategic importance of this phenomenon should 
consider competing theories through the lenses of such moderating or mediating factors.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details relevant literature, to 
provide the theoretical foundation for the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample 
and key variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
2.1. Literature review 
Prior literature proposes two main competing theories to understand the relation 
between CEO duality and firm performance: agency and stewardship theories (see, for example, 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Agency theory predicts 
that agents commit to opportunistic behaviour and indulge in excessive benefits for themselves, 
at the expense of shareholder’ interests. CEO duality is therefore undesirable from this 
perspective, because it grants excess power to a single executive, weakening board monitoring, 
fostering managerial entrenchment and negatively affecting firm performance (Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994; Dalton et al., 1998; Krause et al., 2014). This view appears widely supported 
by practitioners and a growing group of scholars advocating CEO and chair separation, arguing 
that CEO duality weakens corporate governance (for example, Lublin, 2009; Iannelli, 2013; 
Krause, 2017).  
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In contrast, stewardship theory asserts that CEO duality can be beneficial for firm 
performance, because it ensures cohesive leadership, signals firm stability, and inspires 
confidence in firm management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Expertise and knowledge can 
result from CEO duality, along with faster decision-making and status rewards for executives 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Boyd, 1995; He and Wang, 2004). Therefore, a fundamental 
implication of stewardship theory is that CEO duality enhances firm performance by reducing 
costs and inefficiencies that can result from separating the two roles (Brickley et al., 1997). 
Elsayed (2010) adopts a more nuanced view on the determinants of board leadership, 
and emphasizes that the optimal leadership structure varies with the context in which firms are 
operating (see also, He and Wang, 2009; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Krause and 
Semadeni, 2013; Krause, 2017). An important implication of this perspective is that agency 
theory and stewardship theory are complementary viewpoints, which explain different parts of 
the same picture. 
Despite the strong theoretical predictions, the evidence for the impact of CEO duality 
on firm performance is at best mixed, with some studies providing empirical support for the 
agency perspective (for example, Rechner and Dalton 1991; Daily and Dalton 1994; Worrell et 
al., 1997), and others endorsing the stewardship perspective (for example, Donaldson and Davis 
1991; Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997), while many others are inconclusive (for example, 
Rechner and Dalton 1989; Daily and Dalton 1992, 1993; Daily 1995; Baliga et al., 1996).2 
Dalton et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis of board composition and leadership structure reveals little 
supporting evidence for the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Empirical 
research in more recent years has in consequence steered away from investigating the existence 
of a direct (and simple) duality-performance relationship, as researchers quest for new contexts 
                                                            
2 See Krause et al. (2014) for an excellent review. 
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that could help them demystify the strategic importance of CEO duality (Dalton and Dalton, 
2011; Krause et al. 2014; Yang and Zhao, 2014; Duru et al., 2016; Krause, 2017).  
In this vein, some studies consider new empirical approaches and moderating factors to 
investigate the performance effect of CEO duality. For instance, He and Wang’s (2009) findings 
show that CEO duality strengthens the already positive effect of innovative knowledge assets 
on firm performance. In another study, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) report that interim CEO 
successions are associated with lower performance during the period in which the interim 
serves, while CEO duality moderates the impact of this type of succession on firm performance. 
Similarly, Krause and Semadeni (2013) find that separation of the CEO and Chair positions 
positively (negatively) impacts future firm performance when current performance is poor 
(high), with the effect being most dramatic for demotion separations. More recently, Yang and 
Zhao (2014) rely on an exogenous shock to industry competition to show that, when there is a 
change in the firm’s competitive environment, CEO duality firms outperform non-duality firms, 
with the difference in performance being greater for duality firms with better corporate 
governance. In a similar vein, Duru et al. (2016) show that the negative effect of CEO duality 
on firm performance is attenuated by the degree of board independence.  
To conclude this review, despite a very rich literature investigating either the direct or 
moderating effects of CEO duality on firm performance, to the best of our knowledge, we still 
lack evidence about the possible channel(s) through which CEO duality affects firm policies 
and impacts firm performance.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
This study adopts the agency perspective of the firm to consider the internal capital 
allocation policy as a potential channel through which CEO duality might be detrimental to firm 
value. Several studies show that misallocation of internal capital in diversified firms leads to 
investment inefficiencies that are value-destructive (for example, Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan 
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et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ahn and Denis, 2004; Ahn et al., 2006; Datta et al., 
2009; Hovakimian, 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). While offering a variety of important 
insights, these studies focus on agency problems that arise from managerial self-interest, 
irrespective of the board leadership structure and of how CEO duality influences the internal 
capital allocation policy. In this spirit, we derive our two main hypotheses pertaining to the 
relationship between CEO duality and investment efficiency in diversified firms. 
Agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations. In the absence of appropriate monitoring devices and incentive mechanisms, 
managers might be tempted to undertake actions that maximize their own utility (see, for 
example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or simply enjoy the quiet life 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Since CEOs cannot easily diversify their employment risk, 
they may commit to investments that best serve their personal motives to entrench themselves 
and make their replacement much costlier to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In diversified 
firms, the value created from investments depends significantly on the efficiency of the 
allocation of capital across various business segments (Rajan et al., 2000), but the discretion to 
allocate these corporate resources to business segments gives self-interested CEOs a ready 
opportunity to extract private benefits, by misallocating corporate resources.  
Studies of CEO investment decisions consider the presence of “pet projects” that 
generate unduly high private benefits for the CEO (Shin and Stulz, 1998). As Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) also show, managers have an incentive to allocate the firm’s resources to 
investments whose value is higher under them than under the best alternative. This result 
reflects an important aspect of the classic agency problem – that is, excessive investment in 
assets that are complementary to managers’ skills, background, or experience, even when such 
investments are unprofitable for the firm.  
In diversified firms, agency theory maintains that CEOs can distil their private benefits 
of control by engaging in inefficient cross-subsidization, funding value-destroying projects, and 
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ceding to rent-seeking efforts of divisional managers by overinvesting in weak projects at the 
expense of good ones (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan 
et al., 2000). In support of this view, Ahn and Denis (2004) find that diversified firms allocate 
investment funds inefficiently. In a similar vein, Ahn et al. (2006) find that diversified firms 
invest more than their focused peers, this behaviour being driven by favouring overinvestments 
in low-growth business segments, to the detriment of segments with high growth opportunities 
that add value to the firm. Duchin and Sosyura (2013) consider the influence of managerial ties, 
measuring social connections that reflect mutual qualities or experiences between the CEO and 
divisional managers. Their findings suggest that under weak corporate governance, managerial 
ties tend to result in investment inefficiencies and lower firm value. Glaser et al. (2013) also 
uncover mechanisms by which more powerful and better connected divisional managers secure 
relatively more capital allocation in a financially slack environment. Such problems are more 
likely when decision management and decision control are delegated to the same agent, as 
happens when the CEO also chairs the board; under these circumstances, board monitoring 
weakens, and external monitoring, which seemingly could discipline CEO actions, is trivial, 
because the internal capital markets provide CEOs with a means to avoid monitoring from 
external financial markets.  
Building on such burgeoning evidence, this study examines whether CEO duality leads 
to greater proneness to cultivate a domain for pursuing self-serving interests and engaging in 
opportunistic behaviours through the internal capital allocation process. According to Boyd 
(1995), CEO duality is detrimental to the balance between the CEO and the board, because it 
limits the board’s efficacy in monitoring managerial actions. The CEO’s excess power, because 
of the combined leadership structure, provides additional legitimacy to the board’s control 
function and promotes a fruitful environment in which the CEO can engage in managerial 
actions that deviate from shareholders’ interests. In the absence of a clear separation of the two 
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leadership roles, the board’s role in overseeing managerial opportunism is curtailed (Zona, 
2012).  
In summary, a board may fail to interfere diligently in major corporate decisions because 
of its weak role when a CEO is too powerful. Accordingly, CEO duality can then lead to 
misallocation of capital to business divisions, including allocations of more investments to low 
growth, relative to high growth, segments. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with CEO duality are expected to allocate relatively greater 
capital to low growth segments than to high growth segments (i.e., inefficient internal capital 
allocation). 
Following the meta-analysis of Dalton et al. (1998), scholars agree that CEO duality has 
an important role that differs according to circumstances. Duality can produce both positive and 
negative consequences under, different market settings (Boyd, 1995; Worrell et al., 1997; He 
and Wang, 2009), moderating attributes originating from CEO and board characteristics 
(Krause et al., 2014), and may well vary conditionally on the level of firm performance 
(Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Krause and Semadeni, 2013; Krause, 2017). Drawing on 
both management and finance literature, this study further argues that firm context with 
potentially high agency problems amplifies the adverse effect of CEO duality on the internal 
capital allocation efficiency.  
The extant literature advocates free cash flow as a proxy for the existence of potential 
agency issues. Firms with excess free cash flow encounter major agency problems, especially 
if their investment opportunities are limited (see, for example, Jensen, 1986; Lang et al., 1991, 
Chung et al., 2005). The agency costs arise because, when the firm holds too much excess cash, 
a powerful CEO can act opportunistically and seize personal gains from unnecessary value-
destroying investments. Such resource misallocations may offer personal rewards, at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. Limited free cash flows instead inherently reduce managerial 
discretion and act as disciplining forces on CEOs who might be prone to misuse resources to 
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pursue their private goals. The degree of free cash flow availability thus should moderate the 
relationship between CEO duality and the efficiency of internal capital allocation.   
Several management scholars argue that the performance impact of CEO duality is 
contingent on the board’s characteristics (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Davidson et al., 2004; 
Duru et al., 2016), and internal governance mechanisms can be substitutes for CEO duality 
(Rediker and Seth, 1995). Two important board characteristics considered in the literature are 
a board’s independence and staggered boards. Independent board members, those with no ties 
to the company and its CEO, are better suited to improve the effectiveness of board monitoring 
and to sanction the CEO in case of underperformance (see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Weisbach, 1988). Duru et al. (2016) emphasize that board independence amplifies the 
positive effect of CEO duality on firm performance and mitigates the associated costs, which 
in turn leads to a more profitable balance between strong leadership and better board 
monitoring. The implementation of a staggered board is another board characteristic that has 
attracted the interest of scholars in finance and management.3 A staggered board may 
exacerbate agency problems and lead to CEO entrenchment, as it potentially insulates the firm 
from the pressure of the market for corporate control (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Cohen and Wang, 
2013; Amihud and Stoyanov, 2017). Therefore, board characteristics that curb (or heighten) 
agency problems may act as important moderating attributes in the relation between CEO 
duality and the efficiency of internal capital allocation.  
Additionally, executive compensation is an important internal governance device to 
alleviate managerial slack and align managerial incentives with shareholder concerns (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Hölmstrom, 1979). Equity-based compensation is known to attenuate 
agency costs by reducing the non-value-maximizing behaviour of managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989), and to promote collaboration in large diversified firms (Oxley and Pandher, 
                                                            
3 A staggered board is a board structure in which only a fraction of the directors is elected during a shareholder 
meeting, rather than all at once. 
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2016). In the spirit of agency theory, Datta et al. (2009) document that stock grants play an 
important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions. 
As it helps to align managerial interests with those of shareholders, equity-based compensation 
may play an important role in curbing the negative effect of CEO duality on internal investment 
allocation. 
Taken collectively, all these arguments lead to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation 
efficiency prevails only in diversified firms that are exposed to high agency problems. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
Four data sets serve to construct the sample with the required data: CEOs’ equity-based 
compensation and characteristics from Execucomp, firm-level financial data from Compustat, 
segment-level financial data from the Compustat Industrial Segment (CIS) database, and 
corporate governance data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our focus on internal 
capital allocation efficiency means that the primary tests require data of investments at the 
segment level. Since the analysis requires an intra-firm examination of such investments in 
business segments, the sample is restricted to diversified firms that report at least two segments, 
operating in different three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. This criterion is 
also important as diversified structures endow CEOs with additional discretion in allocating 
resources across business segments (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000), making it an 
ideal setting in which to investigate the agency implications of the rent-seeking CEO duality on 
internal capital allocation efficiency.  
To attenuate distortions caused by small firms, which may have negligible sales or 
assets, the selection criteria require total sales of at least $20 million. Financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), as well as firms with any divisions that operate 
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in these sectors, are excluded, because they are subject to specific regulations. Sales generally 
are allocated across the reported segments of a diversified firm, so the sum of all segment sales 
must be within 1% of the total firm sales (Berger and Ofek, 1995). For the purpose of industry 
benchmarking (defined by the median peer-focused firm), another requirement is the existence 
of at least five peer-focused firms in the same three-digit SIC for each segment of the sample 
of diversified firms. The final sample covers the period 1992-2013 and is made up of 4,168 
firm-years and 10,740 segment-year observations. 
 
3.2. Model specification and variable definitions 
3.2.1. Baseline specification 
To measure the effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency, we adopt 
the following segment-level regression equation: 
 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ-𝑞 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1   𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ-𝑞 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡,     (1) 
where the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted investment of segment j at time t, defined 
as segment j’s capital expenditure-to-sales ratio minus the capital expenditure-to-sales ratio of 
the median peer-focused firm operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as segment j. 
Subscript i denotes the firm, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 are firm and year fixed-effects, respectively. Year 
fixed-effects control for changing economic and financing conditions through time. Firm fixed-
effects help isolate intra-firm changes and allow us to better capture the sensitivity of segment 
investment to changes in the independent variable of interest. Firm fixed-effects also mitigate 
concerns about omitted variable biases due to time-invariant firm-level unobservable factors. It 
is also important to note that industry fixed-effects are indirectly controlled for using industry-
adjusted segment variables.  
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The two independent variables of interest in Eq. (1) are CEO Duality and High-q 
Segment. CEO Duality is a dummy variable set equal to one for firm-years during which the 
CEO served also as the board chair, and zero otherwise. High-q Segment is a dummy variable 
set equal to one if the corresponding segment belongs to a high growth industry (high-q), and 
zero otherwise (low-q). Following Ahn et al. (2006) and Datta et al. (2009), a segment is classed 
as high-q if the Tobin’s q of the median peer-focused firm in the corresponding three-digit SIC 
industry is greater than the sales-weighted average Tobin’s q for the firm as a whole. To 
empirically investigate Hypothesis 1, we interact these two independent variables of interest 
(i.e., CEO Duality   High-q Segment). A negative 𝛽3 coefficient indicates that the capital 
allocation process in firms with CEO duality favours low-q over high-q segments, indicating 
the existence of inefficiencies in the capital allocation policy of the firm.4 
The specification in Eq. (1) also controls for a large set of time-varying segment, firm, 
and CEO characteristics: Segment Size, the natural logarithm of the sales of the corresponding 
segment; Relative Segment Size, the segment’s sales divided by the sum of sales across all 
segments of the firm; Segment CF, the industry-adjusted operating cash flow to sales ratio for 
the corresponding segment; Other Segment CF, the industry-adjusted operating cash flow to 
sales ratio for the firm’s remaining segments; Industry Tobin’s q, the Tobin’s q ratio of the 
median peer-focused firm in the three-digit SIC code industry for the corresponding segment; 
Institutional Own, the proportion of institutional ownership in the firm’s ownership structure; 
Firm risk, the variance of the firm’s monthly excess stock returns during the fiscal year; CEO 
Tenure, the natural logarithm of one plus the length of time between the date when the person 
became the CEO and the current fiscal year end; and CEO Own, the proportion of CEO 
ownership in the firm. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. To avoid 
                                                            
4 In our empirical framework, underinvestment in high-q segments is a measure of agency cost due to having CEO 
duality. This is captured by a negative 3 coefficient in Eq. (1). The more negative 3, the higher the agency cost 
associated with CEO duality. The study by Ang et al. (2000) also relies on efficiency ratios as a measure for agency 
costs, but its focus is on operating expenses and efficient use of assets, while we focus on the efficiency of cross-
segment capital allocation.  
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potential problems with outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their distributions. We report robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-
consistent and clustered at the firm level. Firm- and CEO-level right-hand side variables are 
lagged by one-period, to alleviate the concern that CEO duality and the firm’s investment policy 
may be simultaneously determined in equilibrium. 
 
3.2.2. Moderating attributes 
Our study aims to shed light on whether the internal capital allocation policy is 
inefficient in firms characterized as facing potentially high agency problems. Empirically this 
is done by conditioning the regression coefficient of interest, 𝛽3, in Eq. (1), on prominent firm-
specific and CEO-specific variables known to be correlated with agency issues, and therefore 
by capturing the potential misalignment of interests between the CEO and the shareholders. 
Such investigation is also in the spirit of recent studies probing for more research that considers 
moderating attributes that might alter the strength or direction of the relationship (see, for 
example, Krause et al., 2014).  
The first moderating attribute considered is the firm’s free cash flow (Free Cash Flow). 
Firms with high free cash flow are associated with potentially severe agency problems, 
particularly in the presence of a powerful CEO (Jensen, 1986). Free cash flow is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense scaled by total assets.  
Next, we rely on two important board characteristics known to be correlated with weak 
board monitoring and CEO entrenchment: board independence and staggered board (see, for 
example, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Bebchuk et al., 2002). Board independence 
(Board Independence) is measured using the proportion of outside directors in a firm’s board 
of directors. Staggered board (Staggered Board) is a dummy variable set equal to one in cases 
where not all members of the board are elected at the same time, and zero otherwise.  
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Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), we consider equity-based compensation as 
another moderating attribute, since its use can be an effective tool for aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders by exposing managers’ wealth to their firms’ stock prices. To 
capture this, we use the CEO’s Incentive Ratio as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and the 
Delta as in Core and Guay (2002). The Incentive Ratio is calculated such that it captures the 
share of a hypothetical CEO’s total compensation that would come from a 1% increase in the 
value of the equity of their company. The Delta gives the CEO’s option portfolio price 
sensitivity estimated as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s portfolio for a 
1% change in the price of the underlying stock. As such, the higher (lower) the Incentive Ratio 
or Delta, the more (less) sensitive the CEO’s compensation to a change in the firm’s stock price, 
implying potentially lower (higher) agency costs.  
All the moderating attributes are measured with a one-year lag relative to the internal 
capital allocation policy, to ensure that the attributes are not affected by the investment decision. 
Detailed definitions of all the moderating variables appear in the Appendix. 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on CEO and firm characteristics in Panel A, and on 
segment characteristics in Panel B. The proportion of firm-year observations with CEO duality 
is 67% in our sample, a proportion similar to that reported by Yang and Zhao (2014). The 
average tenure of the CEOs is 7.6 years and the average CEO is about 57 years old, figures 
similar to those reported in Andreou et al. (2017b). Institutional investors own on average 37% 
of the firm’s equity capital, while the CEO owns slightly less than 3%. 
At the segment-level, the average industry-adjusted investment is 0.5%, close to the 
magnitude reported by Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn et al. (2006). The mean size of the segment 
is about 456 million USD, the average segment generates about 34% of the firm’s sales, and 
the industry-adjusted ratio of cash flows to sales exhibits a mean of 15.4%, while the same ratio 
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for the firm’s remaining segments is 16.2%. Finally, the industry Tobin’s q displays a mean of 
1.54, and about 49% of a firm’s segments are classified as having high-q growth opportunities.  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the variables considered. Most variables 
correlate with CEO duality and exhibit the expected sign. For example, under the agency view, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Jensen (1986) imply that CEO duality should be pronounced 
for bigger firms (correlation with Segment Size is 0.177, p-value<0.01), Amihud and Lev (1981) 
suggest that CEO duality firms show a tendency to reduce their own risk (correlation with Firm 
Risk is -0.083, p-value<0.01, and CEO Own is -0.011, p-value<0.10), and as suggested by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), such firms engage in self-interested actions at the expense of 
shareholders to reap private benefits and thus destruct value (correlation with Industry Tobin’s 
q is -0.019, p-value<0.01). Further, it is evident that none of the correlations is high enough to 
raise concerns over multicollinearity.5 
[Table 2 here] 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Baseline specification 
In the context of diversified firms, an efficient internal capital allocation policy 
prioritizes business segments with high growth opportunities (high-q segments) in directing its 
resources (Rajan et al., 2000). To examine the relation between CEO duality and internal capital 
allocation efficiency, Table 3 reports the estimation results of Eq. (1).  
Model (1) investigates a specification without the interaction term (CEO Duality  
High-q Segment), whereby the coefficient estimate of CEO Duality is equal to 0.005 (p-
                                                            
5 We rely on the variance inflation factor (VIF) to identify the presence of multicollinearity among the predictors 
of all the regression models. All the predictors in Eq. (1) have a VIF that is in principle lower than 3.9, which 
indicates the absence of severe multicollinearity issues in our models. 
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value<0.05). This indicates that firms following a CEO-Chair leadership structure in year t-1 
on average increase their industry-adjusted segment investment by 0.5% over the next year. 
Overall, model (1) suggests that firms with CEO duality overinvest, relative to firms in which 
these roles are held by different individuals. This result alone squares with agency theory, 
supporting the view that diversified firms appear to incubate entrenched managers who engage 
in self-interested investments at the expense of shareholders to reap private benefits by 
overinvesting and growing their firms beyond their optimal size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). 
In model (2), the coefficient estimate of CEO Duality measures the effect of CEO 
duality on investment in low-q segments, while the interaction term measures the differential 
impact of CEO duality on investment in high-q segments. The coefficient estimate of CEO 
Duality is equal to 0.01 (p-value<0.01) and shows that the overinvestment pattern identified in 
model (1) is mainly concentrated in low-q segments. The coefficient of the CEO Duality  
High-q Segment (i.e., coefficient 𝛽3 in Eq. (1)), which is equal to -0.009 (p-value<0.05), shows 
that firms with CEO duality fail to give priority to high-q segments in their capital allocation 
policy, a result which lends support to Hypothesis 1. As such, our findings contradict the 
efficient internal capital markets paradigm (see, for example, Stein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 
1998), according to which diversified firms should channel corporate resources first to divisions 
with high growth opportunities, which can add value. The findings also suggest that part of the 
observed investment inefficiency documented in prior studies (for example, Rajan et al., 2000; 
Ahn et al., 2006; Datta et al., 2009; Hovakimian, 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013) stems from 
the increased power and the self-interested internal investment behaviour associated with CEO 
duality.6  
                                                            
6 These results remain unchanged under different treatments, in particular where: (i) instead the industry is defined 
at the four-digit SIC, (ii) the models are re-estimated by excluding crisis-years 2001 and 2007-2008, (iii) CEO 
turnover threat effects are controlled for by using a dummy variable that is set equal to one when there is a change 
in a firm’s CEO in the leading year, and zero otherwise, and (iv) CEO age-related voluntary turnover is controlled 
for by using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is of age 65 or above, and zero otherwise. 
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To assess the robustness of our baseline findings, in model (3) we replace the firm fixed-
effects with random-effects that allow for random differences in segment investment across 
firms. This specification makes use of both time-series and cross-sectional variations, and 
controls for the effect of unobservable firm heterogeneity on segment investment. Importantly, 
model (3) shows that the main findings are insensitive to the way we control for unobservable 
firm heterogeneity. 
Another empirical issue we tackle is the potential endogeneity in the relation between 
CEO duality and investment efficiency. The firm’s internal capital allocation policy may be 
both a result of CEO duality and itself a determinant of the firm’s decision to adopt CEO 
duality.7 To account for the possibility of an endogenous relationship between CEO duality and 
investment efficiency, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate the main 
regression equation using two-stage least squares. To implement the IV approach, we need 
instruments that are correlated with CEO duality (i.e., the relevance criterion), and concurrently 
are exogenous to the investment decision (i.e., the exclusion criterion). To instrument CEO 
duality, we use CEO age, as well as a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO’s 
age is greater than the industry mean age in the same three-digit SIC industry for a given year, 
and zero otherwise. Our two instruments are valid in the sense that they satisfy both the 
relevance and exclusion criteria: (i) it is highly probable that CEO duality is significantly and 
positively related to CEO age (Linck et al., 2008; Yang and Zhao, 2014); (ii) to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no evidence showing that CEO age directly affects the internal capital 
allocation efficiency. Models (4) and (5) in Table 3 display the results from the second-stage 
IV estimation, with CEO age and the CEO age dummy as instruments, respectively. Consistent 
with our initial results, in both models the positive and significant impact of CEO duality on 
                                                            
7 However, it is important to emphasize that Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) find no evidence that CEO duality is a 
structure intentionally chosen to optimize firm performance; if the firm chooses a dual leadership regime, the 
reason for this choice is not performance-related.  
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segment investment persists (p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.10, respectively). The interaction 
term also remains negative and highly significant (p-value<0.05 in both models). Therefore, the 
IV approach lends further credence to the notion that CEO duality adversely affects the internal 
capital allocation efficiency in diversified firms.8  
The study has thus far provided strong evidence regarding the adverse impact of CEO 
duality on investment efficiency at the segment level. As further analysis, we investigate 
whether the segment-level investment inefficiency transpires in investment misallocations 
aggregated at the firm level, using two overall measures of efficiency. First, following Ahn and 
Denis (2004), we compute the relative investment efficiency (RINV), which accounts for a 
firm’s capital allocations across all the segments it operates in, by measuring whether (or not) 
allocations toward the relatively high-q segments outweigh allocations to its relatively low-q. 
Second, we follow Rajan et al. (2000) (see also Ahn et al. (2006) and Datta et al., 2009) in 
computing an overall measure of value added by capital allocations, namely relative value 
added (RVA). In essence, RVA postulates that firm value is created when segments with better 
growth opportunities than those that the firm is facing as a whole receive relatively more 
resources compared to segments with inferior growth opportunities than those that the firm is 
facing as a whole. The use of RINV and RVA as dependent variables allows us to discern at the 
firm level the impact of CEO duality on, respectively, the firm’s investment efficiency and the 
                                                            
8 Following the suggestion of two anonymous referees, we conduct additional endogeneity tests. First, we employ 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as an instrument to proxy for weak governance in a firm (see, for example, 
Chhaochharia et al., 2016; Gu, 2016) that could increase the likelihood of observing CEO duality. HHI is computed 
for each of the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries based on the firms in the Compustat universe following the 
estimation scheme in Giroud and Mueller (2011). Second, Elsayed (2010) suggests that corporate leadership 
structure must be viewed as a dynamic process, contingent on the context, actors and time. In this vein, we 
simultaneously use firm size and age to instrument CEO duality. Consistent with the other IV estimations presented 
in Table 3, for both abovementioned tests, the interaction term (CEO Duality × High-q Segment) remains negative 
and significant (p-value<0.10, or better). Third, we estimate a system GMM in the spirit of Abdallah et al. (2015) 
to find again that the interaction term remains negative and significant (p-value<0.05). 
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resulting value creation.9 Like the segment-level evidence, these findings show strong negative 
relations between CEO duality and these two firm-level measures.  
Taking all the evidence together, both segment- and firm-level analyses provide strong 
empirical support for Hypothesis 1 as we demonstrate that CEO duality leads to the allocation 
of relatively more capital to low-q than high-q segments, which substantiate severe internal 
capital allocation inefficiencies.  
 
4.2. Moderating effects  
If CEO duality leads to investment inefficiency on average, are there also factors that 
can exacerbate or mitigate its impact? Do shareholders of firms with potentially high agency 
issues suffer more from the existence of CEO duality in the context of cross-segment capital 
allocation? Does equity-based compensation attenuate the adverse effect of CEO duality on 
investment efficiency? This subsection provides answers to these questions by examining the 
moderating role of firm-specific and CEO-specific variables known to be correlated with the 
severity of agency problems within the firm.  
We first consider a firm’s Free Cash Flow and two important board characteristics, 
namely, Staggered Board and Board Independence, as moderating variables for the relation 
between CEO duality and the efficiency of internal capital allocation. Next, we rely on the 
Incentive Ratio and Delta of the CEO’s compensation package as proxies for the importance of 
equity-based compensation as an incentive mechanism. With the help of each of these variables 
as measured in year t-1, we split the sample into two subsamples that characterize firm context 
with potentially high and low agency problems, respectively. Then for each of these 
subsamples, we estimate the specification in Eq. (1) and report the results in Tables 4 and 5.  
                                                            
9 Due to space limitations, detailed descriptions of the RINV and RVA measures, as well as the model specifications 
and results are included in the online appendix. 
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Models (1) and (2) in Table 4 report on the subsample of firms with high (above the 
yearly median value) and low (below the yearly median value) free cash flows, respectively. 
Models (3) and (4) report on the subsample of firms with and without a staggered board 
structure, respectively. Models (5) and (6) report on the subsample of firms with a low (below 
the yearly median value) and high (above the yearly median value) percentage of independent 
board members, respectively. High free cash flow, the existence of staggered board, and low 
board independence denote firm contexts with potentially high agency problems, and it is in 
these firms that we expect the adverse effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency to be 
more substantial. 
[Table 4 here] 
Table 4 shows that the positive effect of CEO duality on segment overinvestment 
tendency prevails only in models (1), (3), and (5). These are the subsamples of observations 
with potentially high agency problems. Likewise, the coefficient of CEO Duality × High-q 
Segment is negative and statistically significant (p-values<0.05) only in these models. For 
instance, as depicted in model (1), firms with high free cash flows that feature CEO duality in 
year t-1 decrease their industry-adjusted investment in high-q segments by 1.0% over the next 
year, relative to their industry-adjusted investment in low-q segments. Likewise, as shown in 
model (3), firms with staggered board structure reduce their investment in high-q segments by 
2.1%, whereas as per model (5) the reduction in high-q is 1.2% in the case of firms with low 
board independence. Both CEO Duality and CEO Duality × High-q Segment are not statistically 
significant in models (2), (4), and (6), which are the subsamples of firms with potentially low 
agency problems. These results emphasize that low free cash flows, the absence of staggered 
board structure, and high board independence are all firm contexts that are beneficial to the 
balance between strong leadership and better board monitoring.10 As such, they help to avoid 
                                                            
10 Further, we consider other measures of board governance that could influence board monitoring, particularly 
board size, gender diversity and the complexity of corporate structure. We re-estimate our baseline model for the 
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situations according to which powerful CEOs can extract private benefits through misallocating 
corporate resources.  
The low or high agency problems subsamples in Table 5 include observations below or 
above the yearly median values of, respectively, the Incentive Ratio in models (1) and (2), and 
Delta in models (3) and (4), as measured in year t-1. The results show that the negative impact 
of CEO duality on investment efficiency concentrates only in firms with potentially high agency 
problems, due to the absence of enough incentives (models (1) and (3) featuring low Incentive 
Ratio and low Delta, respectively), while the adverse impact of CEO duality on investment 
efficiency disappears in the subsample of firms with potentially low agency problems (models 
(2) and (4) featuring high Incentive Ratio and high Delta, respectively). In general, these 
findings follow in spirit those of Table 4, whereby the positive coefficients of CEO Duality 
reveal a clear tendency of over-investments in low-q segments, while the negative coefficients 
of CEO Duality  High-q Segment offer strong evidence of under-investments in high-q 
segments. Overall, there is compelling evidence that the existence of agency problems allows 
CEO duality to manifest rent-seeking behaviours that erode a firm’s internal investment 
efficiency, even though equity-based compensation can be effective in mitigating such 
inefficiencies.   
[Table 5 here] 
                                                            
subsamples of firms with small vs. large board size, no females on board vs. at least one female on board and 
simple vs. complex corporate structure. Our expectation is that larger boards, no females on board and complex 
firms would associate with poorer monitoring and thus weaker corporate governance structures that accentuate 
agency problems. Unreported results reveal a negative relation between CEO duality and investment efficiency 
for the subsample of firms with a large board; however, this relation is not statistically significant. A finer slicing 
of the data between small-, medium- and large-sized boards reveals a negative relation between CEO duality and 
investment efficiency only for firms with medium-sized boards (hence giving rise to a U-shape relationship). The 
results also reveal a weak negative relation (p-value<0.10) between CEO duality and investment efficiency only 
for the subsample of firms with no females on board. Finally, the results show a strong negative effect of CEO 
duality on investment efficiency only in the case of complex firms (p-value<0.01). 
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Collectively, the results of Tables 4 and 5 highlight the importance of firm contexts 
associated with high agency problems in moderating the negative effect of CEO duality on the 
internal capital allocation efficiency and provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. These 
findings also complement prior literature (see, for example, Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; 
Rediker and Seth, 1995; Davidson et al., 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Duru et al., 2016), as they 
offer additional evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis of internal corporate 
governance devices.  
  
4.3. Additional moderating attributes  
This subsection investigates additional attributes that might potentially moderate the 
relation between CEO duality and internal investment efficiency. The considered attributes are 
(i) CEO ability, (ii) CEO succession origin, and (iii) segment longevity, all measured in year t-
1.11 Table 6 reports the results.  
The managerial ability index we use, which has been developed by Demerjian et al. 
(2012), relies on data envelopment analysis and measures managers’ efficiency in generating 
revenues (see the Appendix for a description of the index construction). Intuitively, we expect 
CEO duality to promote strong leadership and to be more beneficial to firm value when the 
CEO also has high ability, as this is a situation where the manager has the least need to opt for 
rent-seeking behaviour.12 This expectation is founded on two reasons. First, Demerjian et al. 
(2012) find that replacing CEOs with more able CEOs is associated with improvements in 
subsequent firm performance, whereas the reverse is true for less able CEOs. Second, Andreou 
et al. (2017a) find a strong positive relation between CEO ability and capital expenditures 
                                                            
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional tests. 
12 Although the managerial ability index measures the ability of the whole management team, Demerjian et al. 
(2012) document that a substantial portion of the index variance is explained by CEO fixed-effects and as such 
can be used to quantify CEO managerial ability. In this regard, many subsequent studies have used this measure 
to investigate the effects of CEO managerial ability on different firm policies and outcomes (for example, Andreou 
et al., 2017a).  
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during the crisis period, which remains robust in the presence of a large array of control 
variables capturing corporate governance attributes, executive compensation incentives and 
CEO characteristics. Taken together, their results are consistent with the view that high CEO 
ability helps to mitigate under-investment problems, which in turn increases firm value. To test 
this premise, models (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results for the subsample of firms with 
low and high CEO ability, respectively. The low and high subsamples include observations 
below or above the yearly median values of the managerial ability index. Evidently, the negative 
effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only in model (1), indicating that 
powerful CEOs with low managerial ability are more inclined to develop entrenchment 
strategies, perhaps to hedge their employment risk and extract private benefits which they 
cannot otherwise achieve due to incompetency and mediocre talent.  
We next assess whether the impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency relates to 
the CEO succession origin. Karaevli (2007) argues that externally hired CEOs are more likely 
to be performance- and change-oriented in comparison to internally promoted CEOs.13 In 
addition, internally hired CEOs, having strong ties within the firm and its business segments, 
might be more tempted to deviate from an efficiency-driven capital allocation process. This 
reasoning also resonates with the internal capital market efficiency literature, which aims to 
explain misallocation of resources and rent-payment by the CEO to the divisional managers, 
who receive unjustifiably more resource allocation for their divisions (Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000; Rajan et al., 2000; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). We therefore expect the adverse effect of 
CEO duality to be prevalent particularly in the subsample of internally hired CEOs. In general, 
we classify a CEO as externally hired if the appointed CEO has tenure of fewer than 365 days 
in the firm (more details on the classification definition are provided in the Appendix.) Models 
                                                            
13 See also Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017) for the performance effect of CEO succession origin. The authors 
propose an integrated multilevel framework that examines the conditions under which the benefits of outside CEO 
succession outweigh the costs. 
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(3) and (4) in Table 6 report respectively on internally and externally hired CEOs, where the 
interaction term (CEO Duality  High-q Segment) in model (3) is negative and statistically 
significant (p-value<0.01). As expected, the results indicate that the inefficient internal capital 
allocation of powerful CEOs is due to the investment behaviour of internally hired CEOs.  
Finally, we consider the longevity of the respective segment. It could be argued that 
powerful CEOs may find it more convenient for their own personal motives and risk reduction 
tendencies to invest in a long-lived segment, which has proved to survive through the years, 
rather than bearing the uncertainty related to younger segments, still unknown as to whether 
they will be able to survive and succeed in the long-run. It is also plausible that older divisions 
and their divisional managers may have more power and more say over the allocation process of 
the firm or could be better connected to the CEO (see Duchin and Sosyura, 2013, for similar 
arguments). Therefore, we expect to find more investment inefficiency in the allocation process 
in long-lived business segments. The results in models (5) and (6) offer support for these 
conjectures. 
Overall, the results of Table 6 provide additional evidence that is broadly consistent 
with the agency view of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). CEOs’ risk reduction, 
rent extraction, and entrenchment tendencies potentially explain the existence of inefficient 
allocation of internal capital in firms with CEO duality.14 
                                                            
14 A potential alternative explanation to this agency view, is the case of a dutiful CEO-Chair who may not be 
adequately effective in creating value through the capital allocation policy due to her involvement in other (non-
executive related) tasks, such as fostering board and individual director effectiveness or offering their services to 
the board of other firms. Two reasons repudiate this explanation. First, the capital policy of a dutiful CEO-Chair 
should not necessarily result in severe (and systematic) misallocation, as also evidenced in our sample. This is 
what is expected under a responsible and well-functioning board, that is not dictated by a powerful CEO, which 
would take all necessary actions to separate the two roles (i.e., to demote the CEO-Chair role to a CEO only) if 
the CEO becomes overwhelmed with board-related duties. Second, an empirical investigation using the number 
of outside directorships, to proxy for dutiful CEOs who devote time to non-executive tasks outside their firms, 
reveals no significant relation difference between the capital allocation policies of dutiful vs non-dutiful CEOs 
who also chair the board of their firms. 
26 
 
5. Conclusion 
Building on evidence from agency theory and strategic leadership literature, this study 
shows that CEO duality produces a governance context that may encourage CEOs to direct 
corporate resources inefficiently. Prior research on CEO duality has produced notable 
conflicting evidence, likely due to its rather monotonic focus on accounting or market-based 
performance outcomes. This study posits internal capital allocation in diversified firms as a 
potential channel through which CEO duality may negatively affect firm value. 
This study offers compelling empirical evidence that CEO duality leads to investment 
decisions that are detrimental to overall firm value. The evidence of investment misallocation 
and inefficiency suggests that when board monitoring becomes weak (because power is 
concentrated in the hands of a sole agent) and external monitoring is trivial (because internal 
capital markets help the agent avoid monitoring from external markets), agency costs manifest, 
to the detriment of the firm’s shareholders.  
Two important points arise from this study. First, firm contexts associated with high 
agency problems exacerbate the adverse effect of CEO duality on the internal capital allocation 
efficiency. In this context, equity-based compensation is an important internal governance tool 
that has the potential to curb investment inefficiency in diversified firms with CEO duality. 
Second, unlike prior literature that focuses mainly on direct relations with firm performance 
metrics, this study provides an agency perspective on CEO duality pertaining to the internal 
capital allocation policy. The results of this study add to both the strategic leadership literature 
and internal capital markets literature, while also illustrating board structure and executive 
compensation as important moderators of the relation between CEO duality and investment 
efficiency in diversified firms. 
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Appendix 
 
Detailed variable definitions 
 
Dependent variable (measured in year t) 
 
Segment Investment: Industry-adjusted segment investment, defined as the segment’s capital 
expenditure-to-sales ratio minus the capital expenditure-to-sales ratio of the median peer-
focused firm operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as the segment (requiring at least 
five focused firms in the industry). 
 
 
Firm-level independent variables (measured in year t-1) 
 
CEO Duality: A dummy variable that takes the value of one for the firm-years that the CEO is 
also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise. 
 
Institutional Own: The proportion of institutional ownership in the firm ownership structure, 
defined as the ratio of the number of common shares held by institutional investors to the total 
shares outstanding of the firm. 
 
Firm risk: The variance of monthly stock returns of the firm minus the risk-free rate during the 
fiscal year. The risk-free rate is the US government security with a 1-year yield period. 
 
CEO Tenure: The natural logarithm of one plus the length of time between the date when the 
person became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. 
 
CEO Own: The proportion of CEO ownership in the firm ownership structure, defined as the 
ratio of the number of common shares held by the CEO to the total shares outstanding of the 
firm. 
 
Segment-level independent variables (measured in year t) 
 
Segment Size: The natural logarithm of the sales of the segment. 
 
Relative Segment Size: Segment’s sales divided by the sum of sales across all segments of the 
firm.  
 
Segment CF: Industry-adjusted operating income to sales ratio for the corresponding segment 
(requiring at least five peer-focused firms in the industry). 
  
Other Segment CF: Industry-adjusted operating income to sales ratio for the firm’s remaining 
segments (requiring at least five peer-focused firms in the industry). 
  
Industry Tobin’s q: The Tobin’s q of the median peer-focused firm in the three-digit SIC 
industry for the corresponding segment, with Tobin’s q being equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets (requiring at least five peer-focused firms in the industry). 
  
High-q Segment: A dummy variable set equal to one if the Tobin’s q of the median peer-focused 
firm in the segment’s three-digit SIC industry is greater than the sales-weighted Tobin’s q for 
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the firm as a whole, and zero otherwise (requiring at least five peer-focused firms in the 
industry). 
 
Moderating Attributes (measured in year t-1) 
 
Free Cash Flow: Calculated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense 
scaled by total assets. 
  
Staggered Board: In a given year, a firm has a staggered board if not all members of the board 
are elected at the same time.  
  
Board Independence: Calculated as the percentage of independent/outside directors in the 
firm’s board of directors.  
 
Incentive Ratio: CEO’s equity-based incentive ratio is estimated as in Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006). The incentive measure is calculated such that it that captures the share of a 
given CEO’s total compensation that would result from a 1% increase in the value of the equity 
of his or her company. Specifically, 
 
Incentive Ratio = ONEPCT / (ONEPCT + SALARY + BONUS), 
 
where ONEPCT = 0.01*PRICE × (SHARES + OPTIONS); PRICE is the firm share price; 
SHARES is the number of shares held by the CEO; OPTIONS is the number of options held 
by the CEO; and SALARY and BONUS are the CEO salary and bonus, respectively.  
 
Delta: A CEO’s equity portfolio price sensitivity is estimated as the change in the risk-neutral 
value of the executive’s portfolio for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock. The 
parameters of the Black and Scholes formula follow the definitions as in Core and Guay (2002). 
 
Managerial Ability: An index developed by Demerjian et al. (2012).  The measure results from 
the use of data envelopment analysis (DEA), which calculates unit-specific relative efficiency 
to produce an estimate of how efficiently managers use their firms’ resources. Because the 
efficiency measure generated by the DEA estimation is attributable to both the firm and the 
manager, Demerjian et al. (2012) purge the DEA-generated firm efficiency measure of key 
firm-specific characteristics that are expected to aid (firm size, market share, positive free cash 
flow, and firm age) or hinder the management’s efforts (complex multi-segment and 
international operations). The residual efficiency resulting from a Tobit regression in the spirit 
of Demerjian et al. (2012) is the efficiency attributable to the management team of the firm. 
 
Internally Promoted CEO: This dichotomous variable identifies firms with CEOs that are 
internally (or externally) promoted. Founder CEOs, and appointed CEOs who have tenure of at 
least 365 days in the firm are classified as internal. If the date of joining the firm is not available, 
then the CEO must have executive directorship tenure of at least one year to be classified as 
internally promoted.  
 
Long-lived Business Segment: This dichotomous variable identifies business segments with a 
long (or short) life-span in the firm. Following Adelino et al. (2017), we use the cut-off point 
of five years to differentiate between long-lived and short-lived business segments. The age of 
the segment is the number of years the segment has been listed on the Compustat Industrial 
Segment (CIS) database. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Median Maximum St. Deviation 
 
Panel A. CEO and Firm Characteristics      
 
CEO Duality 
 
0.673 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
0.469 
CEO Tenure 7.598 0.496 5.332 37.996 7.344 
CEO Age 56.90 41.00 57.00 77.00 6.622 
CEO Own 0.028 0.000 0.013 0.276 0.046 
Institutional Own 0.368 0.000 0.353 1.000 0.183 
Firm Risk 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.311 0.023 
Panel B. Segment Characteristics 
    
Segment Investment 0.005 -0.402 -0.001 0.495 0.091 
Segment Size 6.122 -1.269 6.177 9.707 1.731 
Relative Segment Size 0.341 0.000 0.274 0.998 0.257 
Segment CF  0.154 -1.185 0.145 0.836 0.194 
Other Segment CF 0.162 -0.975 0.151 0.673 0.131 
Industry Tobin’s q 1.539 0.851 1.386 4.860 0.560 
High-q Segment 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics on the CEO, firm, and segment variables used in the analyses. The 
sample covers the period 1992-2013 and is made up of 10,740 segment-year observations. Segment-level variables 
are measured in year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in year t-1. The definitions of all the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.    CEO Duality            
2.    Segment Investment -0.004           
3.    Segment Size 0.177*** -0.013***          
4.    Relative Segment Size 0.005 -0.048*** 0.220***         
5.    Segment CF 0.021*** -0.012** 0.252*** 0.047***        
6.    Other Segment CF 0.016** 0.013*** 0.195*** -0.145*** 0.265***       
7.    Industry Tobin’s q -0.019*** -0.002 -0.132*** -0.013*** -0.043*** -0.026***      
8.    High-q Segment -0.008 -0.017*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.015*** 0.001 0.431***     
9.    Institutional Own 0.023*** 0.016*** -0.119*** 0.020*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.028*** 0.003    
10.  Firm Risk -0.083*** -0.014*** -0.320*** 0.053*** -0.175*** -0.209*** 0.063*** 0.005 0.011*   
11.  CEO Tenure 0.210*** 0.004 -0.083*** -0.001 -0.036*** -0.024*** 0.041*** 0.009 0.001 0.145***  
12.  CEO Own -0.011* -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.01 0.015** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
Notes. All the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 3. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Instrumental Variable (IV) 
      Segment Size -0.017***  
(0.004) 
-0.017***  
(0.004) 
-0.007***     
(0.001) 
-0.019***        
(0.005) 
-0.019***        
(0.005) 
Relative Segment Size 0.045***   
(0.013) 
0.045***   
(0.013) 
0.011**      
(0.005) 
0.052***        
(0.014) 
0.051***        
(0.015) 
Segment CF  -0.025         
(0.019) 
-0.025      
(0.012) 
-0.025***     
(0.005) 
-0.025          
(0.019) 
-0.025         
(0.019) 
Other Segment CF -0.001          
(0.022) 
-0.001      
(0.022) 
0.008           
(0.008) 
-0.005     
(0.022) 
-0.004    
(0.022) 
Industry Tobin’s q 0.001         
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0.003         
(0.002) 
0.001      
(0.002) 
0.002      
(0.002) 
High-q Segment -0.003        
(0.003) 
0.003       
(0.004) 
0.002         
(0.003) 
0.015      
(0.009) 
0.015          
(0.010) 
Institutional Own 0.002        
(0.008) 
0.002       
(0.008) 
-0.009       
(0.008) 
0.006       
(0.009) 
0.006       
(0.009) 
Firm Risk -0.053       
(0.042) 
-0.053         
(0.042) 
-0.067         
(0.053) 
-0.039            
(0.043) 
-0.038    
(0.043) 
CEO Tenure 0.001           
(0.001) 
0.001       
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.004       
(0.003) 
-0.004    
(0.004) 
CEO Own 0.026       
(0.040) 
0.027        
(0.041) 
-0.020           
(0.027) 
0.001          
(0.000) 
0.001      
(0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.010***   
(0.003) 
0.008**      
(0.003) 
0.052**        
(0.024) 
0.049*       
(0.028) 
CEO Duality  High-q Segment  -0.009**   
(0.005) 
-0.009***            
(0.004) 
-0.028**        
(0.013) 
-0.028**        
(0.013) 
      N 10,740 10,740 10,740 10,687 10,687 
R2 0.239 0.239 0.213 0.239 0.239 
      
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) present 
the results with firm and year fixed-effects, while model (3) presents the results with random effects. Models (4) 
and (5) present the results from the second-stage estimation of the instrument variable (IV) approach. In model (4) 
the IV analysis instruments CEO duality using the natural logarithm of CEO age, while a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the age of the CEO is higher that industry mean age in a given year, and zero otherwise is 
utilized as the instrument in model (5). In all specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment 
investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are measured in year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in 
fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year 
fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: The moderating role of free cash 
flow, staggered board, and board independence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Free Cash Flow Staggered Board Board Independence 
 High  Low Yes No Low  High 
       Segment size  -0.021***         
(0.006) 
-0.014**         
(0.007) 
-0.018***         
(0.003) 
-0.022***         
(0.003) 
-0.023***         
(0.003) 
-0.018***         
(0.003) 
Relative Segment Size 0.072***         
(0.017) 
0.022       
(0.022) 
0.054***         
(0.013) 
0.079***         
(0.014) 
0.078***         
(0.012) 
0.035***         
(0.012) 
Segment CF -0.034        
(0.023) 
-0.014       
(0.029) 
0.020**         
(0.010) 
0.003         
(0.011) 
-0.063***         
(0.009) 
-0.002      
(0.009) 
Other Segment CF 0.019       
(0.038) 
-0.036 *         
(0.021) 
0.047**         
(0.019) 
-0.037**       
(0.018) 
-0.031*         
(0.016) 
0.019        
(0.018) 
Industry Tobin's q -0.001          
(0.003) 
0.001       
(0.005) 
-0.003        
(0.004) 
-0.001   
(0.005) 
-0.009**         
(0.004) 
0.008**         
(0.004) 
High-q Segment 0.004        
(0.005) 
0.005        
(0.008) 
0.012**         
(0.006) 
0.005     
(0.007) 
0.010*       
(0.005) 
-0.006      
(0.006) 
Institutional Own 0.004          
(0.009) 
0.012                 
(0.018) 
0.017         
(0.018) 
0.015     
(0.024) 
0.030*   
(0.018) 
-0.027            
(0.018) 
Firm Risk -0.100**         
(0.049) 
-0.007           
(0.069) 
-0.170      
(0.126) 
0.014     
(0.147) 
-0.154    
(0.118) 
0.063            
(0.097) 
CEO Tenure -0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
0.002               
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
-0.003       
(0.002) 
CEO Own -0.024         
(0.043) 
-0.014           
(0.063) 
-0.008       
(0.085) 
-0.088     
(0.118 ) 
-0.021    
(0.069) 
0.123         
(0.104) 
CEO Duality 0.017***         
(0.005) 
0.004       
(0.006) 
0.011*       
(0.007) 
0.011        
(0.008) 
0.019***         
(0.007) 
0.006          
(0.007) 
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.010**         
(0.005) 
-0.010            
(0.008) 
-0.021***         
(0.006) 
-0.004                       
(0.008) 
-0.012**         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.007) 
       N 6,774 3,966 3,068 2,109 2,911 3,093 
R² 0.295 0.263 0.305 0.314 0.350 0.330 
       
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) report 
the results for the subsamples of firms that have high and low free cash flows, respectively. These high and low 
subsamples are formed based on the yearly median values of the Free Cash Flow variable in fiscal year t-1. Models 
(3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms based on whether or not the firm has a staggered board in 
fiscal year t-1. Models (5) and (6) report the results for the subsamples of firms based on whether the firm has a 
low or high percentage of independent board members, respectively. The high and low subsamples are formed 
based on the yearly median values of the percentage of independent board members in fiscal year t-1. In all the 
model specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-
level variables are measured in fiscal year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in fiscal year t-1. All variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 5. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: The moderating role of CEO 
equity-based compensation 
 
       (1)     (2)    (3)   (4) 
 
             Incentive Ratio 
     Low                        High 
                    Delta 
    Low                          High 
          
Segment size  -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
Relative Segment Size 0.049** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
0.057*** 
(0.020) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
Segment CF -0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
Other Segment CF 0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.036) 
Industry Tobin's q 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
High-q Segment 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Institutional Own 0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Firm Risk -0.093 
(0.070) 
-0.017 
(0.056) 
-0.080 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.077) 
CEO Tenure -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
CEO Own -0.041 
(0.053) 
0.064 
(0.077) 
0.061 
(0.093) 
0.035 
(0.043) 
CEO Duality 0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
     
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
     N 5,389 5,351 5,229 5,511 
R² 0.242 0.298 0.255 0.285 
     
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) use 
the Incentive Ratio variable, which captures the share of the CEO’s total compensation that comes from a 1% 
increase in the firm stock price, while models (3) and (4) use the CEO’s equity portfolio price sensitivity, denoted 
Delta, which is estimated as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s equity portfolio for a 1% change 
in the price of the underlying stock. The low and high subsamples include firms below and above the yearly median 
values of the corresponding variable, respectively, as measured in fiscal year t-1. In all model specifications, the 
dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are 
measure in fiscal year t whereas CEO- and firm-level variables in fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions are given 
in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Table 6. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: Additional results with 
moderating attributes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Low  
Managerial 
Ability 
High  
Managerial 
Ability 
Internally  
Promoted 
CEO 
Externally  
Promoted 
CEO 
Long-lived 
Business 
Segment 
Short-lived 
Business 
Segment 
              
Segment size  -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021***        
(0.005) 
-0.020*                    
(0.011) 
-0.021**     
(0.009) 
-0.012**     
(0.006) 
Relative Segment Size 0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.067***       
(0.017) 
0.065**                 
(0.031) 
0.067***       
(0.025) 
0.035*       
(0.019) 
Segment CF -0.076*** 
(0.007) 
-0.058*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016        
(0.024) 
-0.021       
(0.041) 
0.028            
(0.035) 
-0.068***   
(0.023) 
Other Segment CF 0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.022         
(0.028) 
-0.016       
(0.033) 
0.019            
(0.039) 
-0.024          
(0.027) 
Industry Tobin’s q -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001        
(0.003) 
0.010         
(0.006) 
-0.006       
(0.004) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
High-q Segment 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.009         
(0.006) 
-0.003       
(0.009) 
0.008          
(0.007) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
Institutional Own 0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.010                
(0.012) 
-0.006        
(0.021) 
-0.011         
(0.018) 
-0.003               
(0.012) 
Firm Risk -0.108 
(0.071) 
-0.029 
(0.070) 
-0.082         
(0.067) 
0.018         
(0.065) 
0.026           
(0.060) 
-0.014               
(0.059) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
0.004              
(0.004) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.002        
(0.003) 
CEO Own -0.026 
(0.043) 
0.060 
(0.053) 
-0.027        
(0.062) 
-0.035       
(0.106) 
-0.097         
(0.086) 
0.083**      
(0.038) 
CEO Duality 0.007** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.012***        
(0.004) 
0.024*       
(0.013) 
0.008         
(0.005) 
0.009*        
(0.006) 
       
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.016***            
(0.006) 
-0.008            
(0.010) 
-0.015**             
(0.007) 
-0.003        
(0.005) 
       N 4,149 5,253 6,804 2,269 3,845 4,900 
R² 0.316 0.318 0.279 0.295 0.271 0.263 
       
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) report 
the results for the subsamples of firms with low and high managerial ability in fiscal year t-1, which are firms 
below and above the yearly median values of the managerial ability index of Demerjian et al. (2012), respectively. 
Models (3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms with CEOs that are internally promoted and 
CEOs that are externally promoted, respectively. Models (5) and (6) report the results for the subsamples of firms 
with segments that are newer to the firm (age of five years or younger) and segments that are older to the firm 
(five years and older), respectively. In all the model specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted 
segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are measured in fiscal year t, and CEO- and firm-
level variables in fiscal year t-1.  All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. Regression models are 
estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
 
